Originally published in CounterPunch http://www.counterpunch.org
Weekend Edition
January 3/4, 2004

The Wrong War at the Wrong Time

Military Might Does Not Insure Stability

By JACK SHANAHAN
Vice Admiral, US Navy (Ret.)

Recent polls show that an increasing majority of Americans are growing weary of absorbing the lion's share of responsibility for running the world. They sense that the current administration's use of military force as the primary instrument of statecraft goes against American tradition in conducting our relations with other nations.

While there was a "clear and present danger" from terrorists across the globe and a need to confront them, the Bush Administration's obsession with Saddam Hussein took us into the wrong war at the wrong time.

As a result, terrorists are free to act at will on a worldwide basis while the U.S. searches for a way out of the Iraqi morass and while most of the rest of the world watches from the sidelines.

If we haven't learned already, hopefully we will by the time we extract from Iraq, that military power does not automatically translate into political and economic stability. We need urgently to find new approaches which, if they cannot solve a crisis, at least will allow us to manage—with the help of others—the problems that are surfacing as part of an entirely new set of circumstances.

The U.S. is today the world's sole superpower. If it is our goal to maintain this status quo, like it or not, the U.S. needs to use our considerable political, economic, moral, and military influence to develop and shape a permanent "stand alone" peacekeeping mechanism within the United Nations.

The United Nations has indicated that it is willing to take a more active role in the fight on terrorism, on conflict resolution and to carry out more peace operations. The outbreak of ethnic fighting in the former Yugoslavia brought extensive if not always successful U.N. involvement and mediation. Elsewhere, in the Far East, in Africa, and in Central America, U.N. supervised peace agreements have contributed to the return of stability and encouraged regional participation in finding solutions to regional problems.

While we and the UN should study past operations for "lessons learned", we must carefully avoid becoming mired by the past. The Cold War with its deep east-west antagonisms is history. The future promises closer cooperation among the five permanent members of the Security Council, a promise already realized for many UN operations. Terrorism threatens all five permanent members and so provides a pragmatic basis for cooperation. This cooperative spirit suggests that the Security Council, if provided adequate and experienced staff support, can increasingly assume responsibility for peace operations as alternatives to unilateral military action.

What the UN does not need, nor should it have, is a standing military force. What it does need is a series of initiatives from member nations that gives the UN, under the direction of the Security Council and implemented by the Secretary General, an effective peace keeping and peace enforcement planning capability-in effect a contingency force headquarters. Toward this end, member nations should undertake steps to:

establish, within the Department of Peace Keeping Operations, a legitimate contingency planning staff to include standard staff support functions of intelligence, communications and logistics in lieu of current ad hoc procedures.

establish Regional Peacekeeping Areas (RPKA). Nations within each RPKA, because they have vested interests and posses unique knowledge and understanding of the region's political, economic, military and cultural undercurrents and influences, would establish their own contingency planning staffs similar to that of the UN. Such staffs would be empowered to call on, deploy and serve as the headquarters for earmarked forces designated by regional states for peace operations.

To insure that one or two locally dominant states cannot use the RPKA for their own (as opposed to broader regional) benefit, RPKA interventions could be restricted to those approved by the UN Security Council.

In many parts of the world the forerunner's of RPKAs already exist: the OAS in the Americas, the EU in Europe, the OAU in Africa, ASEAN in Southeast Asia and the Gulf Cooperation Council in the Persian Gulf. Because most of these bodies were established without a military security element as part of their charters, some revisions to and expansion of regional "sovereignty" would have to be negotiated.

earmark a variety of military units to be available for each region. Nations would indicate the numbers and types of armed forces each would be willing to commit to peacekeeping (under Chapter VI of the UN Charter) or peace enforcement (Chapter VII of the UN Charter) operations if called upon by the Security Council. Without at least this level of involvement, RPKA contingency plans would be a sham, the UN (and regional organization's) would be seen as "paper tigers", and support plans for communications, intelligence and logistics would be all but meaningless.

identify a limited number of member nations which could be called upon to provide or augment a wide range of specialized support in the event a region cannot muster these types of units. Specialized support functions which come to mind are satellite communications and reconnaissance, special intelligence, air and sea lift units, airfield control detachments, fresh water (osmosis) units and training facilities.

If the U.S. really wants to protect its national interests without finding itself overcommitted or having to go it alone, we cannot avoid being a major leader in building a more effective UN. Such a role does require unstinting political, financial, and military support for UN peace operations. It also demands the determination to work closely with other nations in building flexible yet viable new structures for international security. If we were to throw our considerable efforts into this approach, within a few years the burden of meeting a broad range of threats would be more equitably shared. With lower threats would come lower military spending throughout the world and an increase in resources available to address acute and growing domestic challenges.

If the UN is to fulfill the promise it held out to the world 58 years ago, it is imperative that the U.S. take the lead in fostering UN organizational reform and regional responsibility. We have the political, administrative and military expertise to move the world; all we need is the will to do so.

Jack Shanahan, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), is a member of Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities. He can be reached at: shanahan@counterpunch.org